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ABSTRACT—This Essay seeks to draw connections between race, 
sexual orientation, and social science in Supreme Court litigation. In 
some respects, advocates for racial minorities and sexual minorities 
face divergent trajectories. Among those asserting civil rights claims, 
LGBT rights claimants have been uniquely successful at the Court 
ever since Romer v. Evans in the mid-1990s. During this period, 
advocates for racial minorities have fought to preserve earlier victories 
in cases such as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and 
have failed to overturn precedents that strictly limit equal protection 
possibilities, such as McCleskey v. Kemp. Nonetheless, we argue that 
the Court’s “fear of too much justice” links race and sexual orientation 
cases and helps to explain victories as well as losses. Even when 
advocates win in a case like Obergefell v. Hodges or Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the Court carefully cabins its opinion so as not to destabilize 
the social hierarchy. We illustrate this claim through a close 
examination of the use of social science in Obergefell. The Court 
disregarded evidence suggesting that same-sex couples and parents 
experience positive differences, as compared to heterosexuals, such as 
instilling greater respect for gender and sexual orientation equality in 
their children. The Court also asserted the innocence of opponents of 
same-sex marriage, ignoring evidence linking the denial of access to 
marriage to homophobia. In short, a movement to upend homophobic 
marriage laws was itself confined by homophobia, which influenced 
which arguments lawyers and Justices could articulate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The last five years have seen historic shifts in social justice movements 
that focus on race and sexual orientation.1 In 2013, a jury acquitted George 
Zimmerman of charges related to the shooting of Trayvon Martin, an 
unarmed African-American teenager whom he wrongly suspected to be a 
criminal.2 Three black women activists responded with a social media-fueled 
movement called #BlackLivesMatter.3 Additional tragic deaths of unarmed 
African-Americans in 2014 and 2015 galvanized unrest in African-American 
communities (and beyond) and activism contesting police tactics such as 
racial profiling and excessive force.4 At the same time, marriage equality 
 
 1 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 125 (2017) (arguing the period of 
2014 to 2016 was highly significant in the history of U.S. race relations); Russell K. Robinson & David 
M. Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 214, 224–26 (2018) (discussing Supreme 
Court developments regarding same-sex marriage from 2013 to 2015). 
 2 See Carbado, supra note 1, at 131 n.23. 
 3 Id.; see also Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory 
[https://perma.cc/LKE7-2ZVB]. Black Lives Matter is also notable because its leaders include prominent 
women, queer, and transgender people—a break from longstanding patterns of marginalization of such 
people in African-American politics. See id. 
 4 See id.; Liz Fields, After Walter Scott Killing, Black Lives Matter Movement Calls For Citizen 
Oversight of Police, VICE NEWS (Apr. 10, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/after-walter-
scott-killing-black-lives-matter-movement-calls-for-citizen-oversight-of-police [https://perma.cc/9J95-
Y8GJ].  
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activists and lawyers were building the cases that they hoped would secure a 
nationwide constitutional right to marry a partner of the same sex.5 In 2013, 
they persuaded the Court to invalidate part of the Defense of Marriage Act, 
a federal law refusing to recognize same-sex marriages.6 Two years later, the 
Court, in Obergefell v. Hodges, announced that every state had to license 
same-sex marriages,7 a decision viewed by many as the capstone of decades 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) legal advocacy.8 By late 
2016, however, both of these issues—marriage equality and police violence 
directed at African-Americans—would be swept off the front pages of 
newspapers by the unexpected election of Donald J. Trump as President.9 
Although the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement continues to organize 
and protest, it has, at present, left little mark on federal law. The battery of 
Supreme Court cases that rebuff the overwhelming majority of legal 
challenges to police misconduct remains very much intact.10 This disparity 
might lead a casual observer to think that LGBT people secured full legal 
equality in recent years, while African-Americans and other people of color 
continue to lose at the Supreme Court. 
While there is truth to the divergent trajectories of African-Americans 
and LGBT claimants at the Supreme Court level,11 this Essay seeks to 
supplement and complicate that narrative. We argue that a “fear of too much 
 
 5 See, e.g., Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife [https://perma.cc/A8B4-RSCE] 
(describing the early development of the Windsor case, which struck down the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 6 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (identifying “strong evidence of [the 
Defense of Marriage Act] having the purpose and effect of disapproval of [same-sex married couples]”); 
id. at 2694, 2696 (concluding that the statute “demeans the couple,” “undermines” their relationship 
privately and publicly, “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples” 
and thus violates the Fifth Amendment). 
 7 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 8 See Robinson & Frost, supra note 1, at 215 n.1 (describing media discourse on Obergefell). 
 9 As one BLM activist stated, “I think the media companies, vying for the very little brain space in 
people’s minds, are reporting on what they think people want to hear about right now. And that’s Trump.” 
Janell Ross & Wesley Lowery, Turning Away from Street Protests, Black Lives Matter Tries a New Tactic 
in the Age of Trump, WASH. POST (May 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-trumps-
america-black-lives-matter-shifts-from-protests-to-policy/2017/05/04/a2acf37a-28fe-11e7-b605-
33413c691853_story.html [https://perma.cc/8SXE-6FN6]. 
 10 See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 1, at 125 (“Fourth Amendment law facilitates the space between 
stopping black people and killing black people.”); see also id. at 130 (“African Americans often 
experience the Fourth Amendment as a system of surveillance, social control, and violence, not as a 
constitutional boundary that protects them from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 11 See generally Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016) [hereinafter 
Robinson, Unequal Protection] (identifying “LGBT exceptionalism” in Supreme Court opinions and 
demonstrating that in that context LGBT plaintiffs have been more successful than women and people of 
color in recent years). 
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justice”12 connects race and sexual orientation cases. Even when LGBT 
people win in cases like Obergefell, or underrepresented racial minorities 
win in affirmative action cases like Fisher v. University of Texas, the Court 
carefully cabins its opinions to preserve the social hierarchy with only 
incremental changes.13 Pressure to “play it safe” may operate at multiple 
levels: lawyers frame arguments to appeal to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
conservative ideology; Justice Kennedy may refrain from articulating 
arguments that he fears will inflame the religious right; and liberal Justices 
may opt not to write separately and repudiate troubling aspects of Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis for fear of losing his swing vote.  
Marriage equality lawyers played this game by presenting 
predominantly white, middle-class, and “all-American” plaintiffs—people 
who were ultimately depicted by Justice Kennedy as “needing” to assimilate 
into marital norms rather than desiring to change them.14 We demonstrate 
that these lawyers selectively drew on social science, sidestepping studies 
suggesting positive differences between same-sex and different-sex couples 
and the transformational potential of same-sex relationships. Rather than 
telling a story of sexual minorities becoming like heterosexuals, the Court 
could have acknowledged that same-sex couples may offer valuable lessons 
for the broader society. By sketching the road not taken—an intersectional, 
more inclusive, and more LGBT-affirming marriage equality claim—our 
analysis suggests that the actual claim in Obergefell mainly mirrored the 
interests of the most privileged members of the class. 
 Moreover, in this Essay, we extend the story about racial justice by 
considering how affirmative action has fared at the Court during this time 
period. The Court’s Fisher decision in 2016 surprised court observers by 
reaffirming Grutter v. Bollinger’s diversity rationale and giving universities 
significant leeway to take race into account as part of a holistic review of 
applicants.15 Fisher, like Obergefell, is a notable victory and worthy of 
celebration. But affirmative action, standing alone, is a rather limited means 
of challenging racial subordination in education. It is no substitute for a 
systematic challenge to the de facto segregation and insufficient funding that 
 
 12 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 13 See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) (discussing “preservation-through-
transformation”). 
 14 This legal strategy permitted the Obergefell Court to find that same-sex marriage was likely to 
strengthen, rather than weaken, “the institution of marriage” by expanding the ranks of married couples. 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015). However, a more substantive means of strengthening marriage would have 
been to highlight and encourage the uniquely healthy dynamics exemplified by some same-sex couples 
and parents, which we discuss more fully below. 
 15 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210, 2214–15 (2016). 
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hobble many of our nation’s public schools.16 Nor does it require critical 
engagement with university admissions processes that effectively prioritize 
socioeconomically privileged applicants. Importantly, the corollary to 
Fisher’s validation of affirmative action is the Court’s ruling, in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, that states may amend their 
constitutions to forbid race-conscious policies without triggering meaningful 
judicial review.17 Thus, even though underrepresented people of color won 
in Grutter, Michigan voters quickly stripped them of this victory, and the 
Court provided no judicial recourse.18 Our triangulation of affirmative action, 
criminal justice, and marriage equality suggests the Court’s preference for 
affirming civil rights only when doing so will not dismantle entrenched 
social hierarchies.19  
Our analysis builds on some first principles. First, science has 
sometimes been used to perpetuate the subordination of people of color, 
women, LGBT people, and many others.20 Second, courts sometimes invoke 
science in order to conceal their value choices in “objective” garb.21 For both 
of these reasons, scholars should subject scientific findings, and legal claims 
utilizing such findings, to critical analysis. A close examination of the 
Court’s treatment of social science in certain leading equal protection cases 
also undercuts any assumption that the Court treats social science in a 
 
 16 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 867 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (describing school segregation as perpetuating “a caste system rooted in the institutions of 
slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 47, 55 (1973) (holding that Texas public education funding scheme did not violate equal protection by 
failing to distribute resources equitably). 
 17 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014); see also Robinson, Unequal 
Protection, supra note 11, at 215–26 (demonstrating tension between Schuette and the Court’s sexual 
orientation precedents). 
 18 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (“There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in 
this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination 
to the voters.”). Eight states have banned race-conscious policies: California, Washington, Michigan, 
Nebraska, Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida, and New Hampshire. See Halley Potter, What Can We Learn 
from States that Ban Affirmative Action, CENTURY FOUND. (June 26, 2014), https://tcf.org/content/
commentary/what-can-we-learn-from-states-that-ban-affirmative-action [https://perma.cc/K94D-S3U3]. 
 19 See Robinson, Unequal Protection, supra note 11, at 228 (referring to the Court’s Obergefell 
decision as granting only “equality on the cheap” to the marriage equality movement). 
 20 See, e.g., RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF 
DIAGNOSIS 49–50 (1981); DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG 
BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–25 (2011); Clare Huntington, The 
Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 296–310 (2018). See generally Robinson & 
Frost, supra note 1 (arguing that HIV-related public policies instill stereotypes about sex between men). 
 21 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (looking to “medical and medical-legal history” 
to identify a right to terminate a pregnancy); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) 
(invoking social psychology scholarship on internalized racism to justify invalidating laws that required 
racially-segregated public schools). 
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uniform manner. We suggest that the Court’s openness to social science in 
such litigation will depend on the extent to which its presentation threatens 
to unleash what the Court regards as “too much justice.” When faced with 
competing bodies of social scientific discourse, we can expect the Court to 
emphasize the strand that minimally disrupts the status quo. 
I. INJUSTICE, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND FEAR 
In this Part, we argue that a “fear of too much justice,” particularly law 
reform efforts that would require the courts to restructure inequitable 
institutions, animates several leading civil rights cases. Importantly, this fear 
surfaces not only in cases in which the Court rejects the civil rights claim, 
but also those in which it rules in favor of a racial or sexual minority group. 
We argue that scholars who study how courts engage social science in civil 
rights cases must always keep these power dynamics in mind, as they are 
likely to shape how lawyers deploy social science and whether and how the 
Court engages with it.22 
McCleskey v. Kemp23 serves as the Court’s most controversial rejection 
of social science evidence, and it also represents perhaps the Court’s most 
notorious criminal justice opinion. Warren McCleskey, an African-
American man from Georgia, was sentenced to death for his role in the 
murder of a white police officer.24 In order to show that race played a 
significant role in the state’s decision to sentence him to death—and that this 
violated the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments—McCleskey enlisted 
David Baldus, a professor who conducted a sophisticated empirical analysis 
on the Georgia capital sentencing regime. McCleskey’s core equal protection 
claim was that Georgia valued the lives of Whites more than the lives of 
Blacks, and that a black person who was convicted of killing a white person 
was particularly likely to be sentenced to death.25 Baldus’s study concluded 
that, “even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged 
with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence 
as defendants charged with killing blacks.”26  
Even though “over half —55%—of defendants in white-victim crimes 
in Georgia would not have been sentenced to die if their victims had been 
 
 22 See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 
20 J.L. & POL. 33, 65 (2004) (suggesting that amici have incentives to distort or ignore social science 
findings that are contrary to their position). 
 23 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 24 Id. at 283–85. 
 25 See id. at 287. 
 26 Id. 
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black,”27 and even though the Court had looked to statistical evidence in 
recent equal protection cases and Title VII cases,28 the McCleskey majority 
dismissed Baldus’s empirical evidence.29 McCleskey’s use of the Baldus 
study to show systemic bias in Fulton County, Georgia, was inapt, the Court 
said, because it failed to “prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted 
with discriminatory purpose.”30 
McCleskey did not rely on science alone; he also drew on Georgia’s 
well-documented history of racial antagonism and criminal laws that 
formally segregated offenses based on the race of the defendant and the 
victim. The Court derided this “historical evidence” as similarly irrelevant: 
“Although the history of racial discrimination in this country is undeniable, 
we cannot accept official actions taken long ago as evidence of current 
intent.”31  
The majority repeatedly adverted to the sweeping scope of 
McCleskey’s claim and its capacity to unsettle the country’s entire criminal 
justice system.32 Moreover, notes from the Justices’ files suggest that the 
Court’s denial of McCleskey’s claim had less to do with any failings of the 
social science in the record and more to do with a fear that recognizing the 
 
 27 Id. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 28 Id. at 293–94 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in part); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977)); see also 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986) (developing a framework for inferring racial 
discrimination that permits the use of statistical evidence). 
 29 The majority declared: “we assume the study is valid statistically . . . . Our assumption that the 
Baldus study is statistically valid does not include the assumption that the study shows that racial 
considerations actually enter into any sentencing decisions in Georgia.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7; 
see also id. at 312–13 (“At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with 
race . . . . The discrepancy indicated by the Baldus study is ‘a far cry from the major systemic defects 
identified in Furman [v. Georgia].’”). 
 30 Id. at 292. Justice Lewis Powell pointed to Baldus’s own testimony on the limits of what his study 
could prove. Baldus testified: “Models that are developed talk about the effect on the average. They do 
not depict the experience of a single individual. What they say, for example, [is] that on the average, the 
race of the victim, if it is white, increases on the average the probability . . . [that] the death sentence 
would be given.” Id. at 293 n.11. 
 31 Id. at 298 n.20. But see id. at 329–33 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (carefully laying out the copious 
historical evidence linking the findings of the Baldus study to Georgia’s long history of penalizing 
interracial murder and rape differently depending on the race of the defendant and victim). 
 32 See id. at 292 (“In its broadest form, McCleskey’s claim of discrimination extends to every actor 
in the Georgia capital sentencing process, from the prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury 
that imposed the sentence, to the State itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to 
remain in effect despite its allegedly discriminatory application.”); id. at 293 (“McCleskey’s claim that 
these statistics are sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, would 
extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant was black.”); 
id. at 297 (“McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system.”); id. at 
314–15 (“McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles 
that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”).  
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bias in Georgia’s death penalty regime would immerse the courts in critically 
evaluating the racial disparities that pervade the criminal justice system at 
multiple levels.33 Faced with this daunting task, the Court simply looked 
away from the equal protection problem. A similar “fear of too much 
justice,”34 we argue, is apparent even in cases where the Court relied on social 
science to advance racial justice. 
The most famous equal protection case is also the foremost example of 
the Court relying on social science. In Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Court declared policies that require racially segregated schools to be 
inherently unequal because, it said, they instill in black children “a feeling 
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”35 The Court supported this 
claim with a footnote citing psychological scholarship by Kenneth B. Clark 
and others.36 At the same time, however, the Court deferred the question of 
implementation of its mandate to desegregate the schools.37 When the Court 
finally answered that question, its command that courts should proceed with 
“all deliberate speed”38 reflected ambivalence and trepidation. As Charles 
Ogletree explained, this phrase actually meant “slow.”39 The Brown Court’s 
 
 33 The Court wrote that it would require “far stronger proof” before even requiring the state to 
respond to the allegation of racial bias. Id. at 296–97. Justice Antonin Scalia, however, in a memo to the 
conference of Justices, offered what might be a more candid explanation for the majority opinion (which 
he joined): 
I disagree with the argument [in Justice Powell’s draft opinion] that the inferences that can be drawn 
from the Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the 
large number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit in the opinion, that an effect 
of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could only be shown by sufficiently strong statistical 
evidence, would require reversal. Since it is my view that unconscious operation of irrational 
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial 
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly 
say that all I need is more proof. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the 
Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 528 (1995) (reproducing the memorandum in full); see 
also Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1844–47 (2012) (examining 
McCleskey’s dismissal of relevant evidence of bias). 
 34 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 35 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 36 Id. at 494 n.11. Numerous legal and social science scholars have criticized the underlying science 
and the Brown Court’s decision to rely on it. See, e.g., Gwen Bergner, Black Children, White Preference: 
Brown v. Board, The Doll Tests, and the Politics of Self-Esteem, 61 AM. Q. 299, 309–314 (2009); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (1959); see also 
Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 100 (2004) (offering a related critique of Brown). 
 37 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“[T]he formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of 
considerable complexity.”). 
 38 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 39 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed?: Brown’s Past and Brown’s Future, 107 W. VA. L. 
REV. 625, 628 (2005). 
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“moral equivocation at a crucial moment [represented] a political backing 
off so as to leave the solution to the very states that had created the problem. 
This message of slowness was heeded across the country.”40 
The Court’s other major turn to social science in race-related equal 
protection cases came nearly fifty years later in Grutter v. Bollinger.41 In that 
2003 affirmative action case, the Court reaffirmed the diversity rationale as 
articulated in Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke.42 The Grutter majority held that the University of 
Michigan Law School had a “compelling interest” in obtaining the 
educational benefits associated with a diverse study body.43 Thus, 
universities could take race into account in admitting students as one aspect 
of a broader, holistic commitment to diversity. In order to support its claim 
that diversity confers educational benefits, the Court cited “expert studies 
and reports entered into evidence at trial [and] numerous [scientific] studies” 
in the record, including those cited in an amicus brief by the American 
Educational Research Association.44  
This victory was tempered by important limitations. First, the Court 
declined to rely on the interest in remedying past discrimination, which 
detached the rationale for affirmative action from the long history of racial 
subordination. By stressing that diversity-based policies benefit people of all 
different stripes—say, a white tuba player from Idaho—the Court deflected 
attention from and cloaked specific racial harms that do not extend to white 
tuba players.45 While the McCleskey opinion curtly dismissed the relevance 
of historical evidence of racial discrimination,46 the Grutter Court more 
deftly bracketed an engagement of our nation’s ugly history of white 
supremacy in favor of a forward-looking and more “racially neutral” 
conception of diversity. As Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut argue in 
a related article in this Symposium Issue, the ostensibly neutral framing of 
“diversity benefits” may mask a focus on admitting people of color in order 
to enhance white students’ classroom experiences. They cite scientific 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 42 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 43 539 U.S. at 328–29.  
 44 Id. at 330 (citing Brief of the Am. Educ. Res. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398292); see also id. (“These benefits are not 
theoretical but real.”); Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: Does Diversity 
Benefits Ideology Undermine Inclusion?, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1612–13 (2018). 
 45 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003) (arguing 
that Grutter diverted attention from racial and socioeconomic subordination); Stephen M. Rich, What 
Diversity Contributes to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1017–18 (2016). 
 46 See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
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research that raises questions about “whether the benefits of [interracial] 
contact extend equally across groups” or predominantly accrue to white 
students.47 
Second, Grutter and the subsequent Fisher decisions48 are less 
consequential when put in their proper context. The number of slots that flow 
to underrepresented minorities because of race-conscious admissions 
policies are relatively few.49 Although preserving access for these few 
underrepresented minorities is important, such policies do not challenge the 
basic infrastructure of university admissions and the educational system that 
feeds students into universities and graduate schools. The second Fisher 
decision (Fisher II) appears to defer to what the Court regarded as fair 
procedures to determine admissions practices and to use them as a proxy for 
the question of whether taking race into account is truly necessary to achieve 
a “critical mass” of underrepresented students.50 This “stay the course” 
approach starkly contrasts with the destabilizing demands that the dissenting 
Justices would have levied on universities. In Fisher II, Justice Samuel Alito 
would have required the University of Texas to provide much more extensive 
and detailed empirical evidence, including determining exactly how many 
students benefited from taking race into account and in which classes they 
enrolled.51 In Grutter, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined in part by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, went ever further. They would have required the University 
of Michigan to choose between use of the LSAT, which buttresses its elite 
status, and its interest in racial diversity.52 These dissenters demonstrated a 
taste for invasive judicial intervention and would have wielded it to deter 
universities from adopting race-conscious policies. The Court majority 
eschewed these approaches, and both Grutter and Fisher II can be 
understood as deferring to the status quo. This is a victory for 
underrepresented minorities insofar as it suggests that at least as long as 
Justice Kennedy remains the swing vote, the Court may leave universities in 
peace to carry out race-conscious policies. However, the Justices in Fisher 
II and Grutter were fighting over a rather modest departure from “color-
 
 47 Hurd & Plaut, supra note 44, at 1623. 
 48 Fisher v. Univ., of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420–22 (2013) (holding the Fifth Circuit erred by deferring to university in conducting 
Court’s narrow tailoring analysis). 
 49 See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective 
Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (2002). 
 50 Cf. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (“It is the University's ongoing obligation to engage in constant 
deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies.”). 
 51 Id. at 2216, 2222, 2226–27, 2241 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 52 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 356 n.4, 369–70 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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blind” admissions policies that disproportionately benefit affluent and 
middle-class students.53 The Court majority declined to call into question 
universities’ general reliance on standardized tests and “legacy” 
admissions,54 two practices that typically benefit white upper- and middle- 
class students. The Kennedy-led majority has shown little interest in 
questioning dominant conceptions of “merit” as embodied in standardized 
tests.55 In Fisher II, some social science scholars filed briefs in order to show 
the need for policies that counteract the flawed and biased nature of 
standardized tests and other structural conditions, such as “stereotype 
threat,” that make students of color vulnerable and depress their academic 
performance.56 But the Court majority ignored this body of science, 
reinscribing the “diversity benefits” rationale from Grutter and generally 
avoiding a discussion of racial discrimination.57 
This critical analysis of race equal protection precedents has tried to 
show that, despite their disparate outcomes and differences in receptivity to 
social science, McCleskey, Brown, Grutter, and Fisher share significant 
connective tissue, namely a fear of dramatic social transformation.58 Ever 
since Brown’s unsuccessful attempt to reform the public school system, the 
Court tends to shrink from extensive engagement with systems that 
consistently disadvantage minorities. This context helps explain why the 
Court refused to open the door to wide-scale reform of the criminal justice 
 
 53 Bell, supra note 45, at 1622 (“The tremendous attention directed at diversity programs diverts 
concern and resources from the serious barriers of poverty that exclude far more students from entering 
college than are likely to gain admission under an affirmative action program.”). 
 54 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2240 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing what Justice Alito called a secretive 
legacy admissions process at the University of Texas). 
 55 See Bell, supra note 45, at 1632 (“Diversity then is less a means of continuing minority admissions 
programs in the face of widespread opposition than it is a shield behind which college administrators can 
retain policies of admission that are woefully poor measures of quality, but convenient vehicles for 
admitting the children of wealth and privilege.”). 
 56 E.g., Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23–25, 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6774020 (arguing that stereotype threat depresses 
standardized test scores and GPAs for underrepresented minorities, thus making them flawed measures 
of merit); see also Hurd & Plaut, supra note 44, at 1616–19. (summarizing briefs in the Fisher cases). 
 57 Cf. Bell, supra note 45, at 1625 (arguing that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor found the policy in 
Grutter acceptable because it “minimize[d] the importance of race while offering maximum protection to 
whites”). 
 58 See also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979) (expressing concern that 
striking down a veterans hiring preference as an equal protection violation might require the Court to 
confront gender-based “enlistment policies of the Armed Forces”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
248 (1976) (“A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling 
justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far-reaching and 
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than 
to the more affluent white.”). 
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system in McCleskey and why marriage equality, which we consider in the 
next Part, was an appealing opportunity for judicial intervention. 
II. BIFURCATING GAY AND LESBIAN LIVES: SAMENESS V. DAMAGE 
During the Supreme Court oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry,59 
which concerned the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8’s ban on 
same-sex marriage, Chief Justice John Roberts identified a tension between 
two claims made by lawyers representing same-sex couples seeking the right 
to marry.60 His exchange with Solicitor General Donald Verrilli sets up our 
exploration of the social science supporting these competing claims: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: [I]t seems to me that your position that you are 
supporting is somewhat internally inconsistent. We see the argument made that 
there is no problem with extending marriage to same-sex couples because 
children raised by same-sex couples are doing just fine and there is no evidence 
that they are being harmed. And the other argument is Proposition 8 harms 
children by not allowing same-sex couples to marriage [sic]. Which is it? 
GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I -- I think what Proposition 8 does is deny the 
long-term stabilizing effect that marriage brings. That’s -- that's the argument 
for -- for marriage, that -- 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you also tell me there has been no harm 
shown to children of same-sex couples. 
GENERAL VERRILLI: California -- there are 37,000 children in same-sex 
families in California now. Their parents cannot marry and that has effects on 
them in the here and now. A stabilizing effect is not there. When they go to 
school, they have to -- you know -- they don’t have parents like everybody else’s 
parents. That’s a real effect, a real cost in the here and now.61 
The following discussion provides the scientific context that gave rise 
to the apparent tension between the claim that laws denying them access to 
marriage harm same-sex couples and their children, and yet, the relationships 
and children of same-sex couples are no less “healthy” than heterosexuals’. 
Over the past several decades, research in the social and health sciences on 
sexual minority health and well-being—stemming mainly from psychology, 
sociology, and public health—has grown exponentially. For the purposes of 
this analysis, we divide findings from this broad field of research into two 
 
 59 570 U.S. 693 (2013). 
 60 Transcript of Oral Argument at 61–62, Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. 693 (No. 12-144); see also David 
M. Frost, Redemptive Framings of Minority Stress and their Association with Closeness in Same-Sex 
Relationships, 13 J. COUPLE & RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 219 (2014) (discussing the tension between 
bodies of social science evidence scholarship making these claims). 
 61 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 61–62. 
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streams in order to highlight the benefits and challenges that social science 
evidence has posed for policy discussions around marriage equality in the 
United States. First, we consider how research evidence has been fed into a 
discourse of “sameness” in an attempt to demonstrate that sexual minority 
individuals and couples are no different from their heterosexual counterparts 
on key health and well-being outcomes. Second, we discuss another stream 
of research which contributes to a discourse of “minority stress” or 
“damage.” This stream points to the ways in which structural (e.g., 
discriminatory laws and policies) and interpersonal (e.g., workplace and 
familial discrimination) stigma can be damaging to the health and well-being 
of sexual minorities, as well as their relationships and families. 
From a social science perspective, discourses like these can be 
problematic, because they individually fail to represent the whole of sexual 
minorities’ lived experiences. However, isolating findings within these 
separate discourses has proven useful at various points within policy change 
efforts. After providing a brief review of these two streams of research, the 
next Section will discuss the tensions that have emerged as a result of using 
evidence from the social sciences in marriage equality efforts.  
A. Evidence of “Sameness” 
Perhaps the most influential research findings on the status of sexual 
minorities in the mental health literature emerged from a 1957 study 
conducted by Evelyn Hooker, which demonstrated that gay men’s responses 
to a popular projective technique used in the diagnosis of mental health 
problems were not distinguishable from the responses of heterosexual men.62 
Hooker’s research provided a turning point because she studied highly 
functional men in the general population unlike most prior research, which 
had focused on unrepresentative samples, such as “homosexuals in prisons, 
mental hospitals, or the disciplinary barracks of the armed services.”63 The 
majority of her subjects had successfully maintained long-term romantic 
relationships.64 Hooker’s foundational finding of sameness ultimately played 
a pivotal role in the effective removal of homosexuality from the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders (DSM), thereby winning a major battle in efforts to 
“depathologize” homosexuality within the medical community.65 
 
 62 Evelyn Hooker, The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual, 21 J. OF PROJECTIVE 
TECHNIQUES 18 (1957). 
 63 BAYER, supra note 20, at 49–50. 
 64 Id. at 52. 
 65 For historical reviews, see id.; Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 
5 BEHAV. SCI. 565 (2015). Ronald Bayer’s fascinating historical account makes clear that Hooker and 
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This approach mirrors the courts’ efforts to depathologize same-sex 
relationships from the standpoint of marriage policy, which—until 
recently—was restricted to male–female couples in the majority of U.S. 
states. Specifically, findings from decades of studies using between-groups 
designs, which compare same-sex male and female couples with different-
sex couples, became especially useful in documenting the lack of meaningful 
differences between the groups on a variety of important relational 
outcomes. 
For example, Lawrence Kurdek’s influential line of research detected 
no differences between same-sex male and female cohabiting couples and 
different-sex married couples. Across two longitudinal studies involving 
eight annual assessments with hundreds of couples, Kurdek observed no 
differences in important benchmarks surrounding psychological adjustment 
and relationship quality.66 The lack of differences observed in these data led 
Kurdek to conclude that “there is no evidence that gay partners and lesbian 
partners were psychologically maladjusted, that they had high levels of 
personality traits that predisposed them to relationship problems, that they 
had dysfunctional working models of their relationships, [or] that they used 
ineffective strategies to resolve conflict.”67 Other studies have also found 
similarities between individuals in same-sex and different-sex couples in the 
meanings and importance they place on the role of intimacy and relationships 
in their lives.68 These are just some illustrative examples of many studies that 
find no differences between same-sex and different-sex couples in between-
 
the American Psychiatric Association were keenly aware of the political stakes of this research. Hooker 
was in conversation with gay rights groups such as the Mattachine Society and found some of her subjects 
through them. See BAYER, supra note 20, at 50, 53. Gay rights activists assailed psychiatry’s role in 
stigmatizing their identities by disrupting the Association’s annual conferences, picketing lectures by 
prominent psychiatrists who fought to preserve the pathologizing conception of homosexuality, and 
helping closeted psychiatrists to come out to their colleagues and articulate the injuries their profession 
was inflicting on them. Id. at 92, 98–99, 102, 109. While early gay rights groups had deferred to 
psychiatry’s claim of expertise, an increasingly adamant cohort of (nonscientist) gay rights leaders in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s insisted that “We are the true authorities on homosexuality whether we are 
accepted as such or not” and “gay is good.” Id. at 82–83, 91. 
 66 Lawrence A. Kurdek, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different from 
Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 880 (2004) [hereinafter Kurdek, Cohabitating 
Couples]; Lawrence A. Kurdek, What Do We Know About Gay and Lesbian Couples?, 14 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 251 (2005) [hereinafter Kurdek, What Do We Know]. 
 67 Kurdek, Cohabitating Couples, supra note 66, at 896. 
 68 See, e.g., David M. Frost & Kelly A. Gola, Meanings of Intimacy: A Comparison of Members of 
Heterosexual and Same-Sex Couples, 15 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 382 (2015). 
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group studies69 and the health and adjustment of children of same-sex 
parents.70 
B. Evidence of “Damage” 
In contrast to the early research of psychologists and psychiatrists 
aimed at depathologizing homosexuality, a sizable number of studies—
typically conducted by public health and social epidemiology scholars—
have demonstrated that sexual minority populations experience higher levels 
of psychological distress and disorder compared to heterosexuals.71 These 
inequalities in mental health do not, however, contradict the arguments of 
earlier psychologists and psychiatrists that homosexuality is not a symptom 
of pathology. Instead, the disadvantaged social status afforded to sexual 
minorities relative to heterosexuals and the persistence of social stigma 
surrounding sexual minority identities and same-sex sexuality is theorized to 
cause these persistent health inequalities. In other words, the root of these 
differences lies in the social marginalization of sexual minorities and is not 
a property of a sexual minority identity per se.72 
Minority stress theory seeks to explain how social stress, stemming 
from disadvantaged social status, explains the continued existence of sexual- 
orientation-based health disparities. The minority stress framework 
articulates specific and unique minority stressors that sexual minority 
individuals are potentially exposed to as a result of their stigmatized social 
status, and posits that these unique stressors put sexual minorities at greater 
risk for mental and physical health problems relative to heterosexuals.73 
These stressors include event-based forms of discrimination (i.e., prejudice 
events), “non-event” stress (e.g., failing to attain important events, such as 
marriage, by a certain age), as well as chronic and everyday forms of 
 
 69 For comprehensive reviews, see Kurdek, What Do We Know, supra note 66, and Letitia A. Peplau 
& Adam W. Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 405 
(2007). 
 70 See Timothy J. Biblarz & Judith Stacey, How Does the Gender of Parents Matter?, 72 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 3 (2010). 
 71 For meta analyses, see, for example, Michael King et al., A Systematic Review of Mental Disorder, 
Suicide, and Deliberate Self Harm in Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual People, 8 BMC PSYCHIATRY 70 (2008), 
and Ilan Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: 
Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 674 (2003).  
 72 See generally Meyer, supra note 71 (stating that stigma, prejudice, and discrimination are forms 
of minority stress which explain the disparities in mental health problems faced by lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual populations). 
 73 See id.; Ilan H. Meyer & David M. Frost, Minority Stress and the Health of Sexual Minorities, in 
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 252, 252–66 (Charlotte J. Patterson & Anthony 
R. D’Augelli eds., 2013). 
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discrimination (i.e., being treated with less courtesy, people acting as if they 
are afraid of you).74 
These externally generated forms of differential treatment from society 
can lead to psychological forms of stigma-related stress, such as entering into 
situations expecting to be discriminated against (i.e., expectations of 
rejection), the need to manage how “out” one is to other people across 
various contexts in life (i.e., stigma concealment), and the application of 
societal devaluation of sexual minorities to one’s own sense of self (i.e., 
internalized stigma). Indeed, some studies have shown that when statistically 
controlling for exposure to various forms of minority stress, differences in 
mental health between heterosexuals and sexual minorities are substantially 
attenuated or no longer detectable.75  
A growing body of research shows that not only do these forms of stress 
burden people as individuals, they also can harm sexual minorities’ efforts 
to seek and maintain romantic relationships.76 For example, people in same-
sex relationships, like their sexual minority counterparts who are single, 
experience discrimination as well as daily hassles and harassment,77 and 
these daily struggles can burden their relationships. There is also some 
evidence to suggest that, as compared to their single peers, sexual minorities 
in same-sex relationships might be exposed to more stress associated with 
being rejected and misunderstood by other people in their lives, particularly 
 
 74 See Meyer, supra note 71, at 676–77. See generally David M. Frost & Allen J. LeBlanc, Nonevent 
Stress Contributes to Mental Health Disparities Based on Sexual Orientation: Evidence from a Personal 
Projects Analysis, 84 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 557 (2014) (exploring non-event stress). 
 75 See Vickie M. Mays & Susan D. Cochran, Mental Health Correlates of Perceived Discrimination 
Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in the United States, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1869 (2001); 
Frost & LeBlanc, supra note 74.  
 76 See generally David Matthew Doyle & Lisa Molix, Social Stigma and Sexual Minorities’ 
Romantic Relationship Functioning: A Meta-Analytic Review, 41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1363 (2015) (conducting review of thirty-five studies and concluding that social stigma against sexual 
minorities is associated with impaired relationship outcomes); Sharon S. Rostosky & Ellen D.B. Riggle, 
Same-Sex Relationships and Minority Stress, 13 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHOL. 29 (2017) (reviewing 
research on minority stress and same-sex relationships). 
 77 See generally Lisa Diamond, The Intimate Same-Sex Relationships of Sexual Minorities, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 293 (Anita L. Vangelisti & Daniel Perlman eds., 
2006) (providing overview of research on same-sex relationships, including issues of stigmatization and 
relationship dynamics and satisfaction); Robert-Jay Green & Valory Mitchell, Gay and Lesbian Couples 
in Therapy: Minority Stress, Relational Ambiguity, and Families of Choice, in CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
COUPLE THERAPY 662 (Alan S. Gurman ed., 4th ed. 2008) (describing the unique challenges facing same-
sex couples, including minority stress, relational ambiguity, and developing a social support network); 
Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 69 (reviewing empirical research on same-sex couples, including the 
impact of societal prejudice and discrimination on same-sex partners); Rostosky & Riggle, supra note 76 
(same). 
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by their families of origin.78 Moreover, societal stigma surrounding same-sex 
relationships can also be uniquely internalized, contributing to feelings of 
internalized homophobia among people in same-sex relationships,79 which 
has been shown to be particularly detrimental to relationship quality among 
sexual minority individuals.80 These interpersonal stressors, along with other 
forms of discrimination and victimization, are associated with decreased 
relationship quality.81 
Why do these competing bodies of scholarship matter? Each of the 
“damage” and “sameness” discourses is problematic if presented alone, 
because isolating one or the other fails to represent the whole of sexual 
minorities’ lived experiences.82 As LGBT people, we may have the same 
basic desires and life goals as heterosexuals and yet face unique forms of 
stress as we seek to achieve those goals.83 These barriers extend far beyond 
the availability of a marriage license, and courts should know that. Judges 
should make decisions with a full understanding of LGBT people’s lives, not 
just the slivers that lawyers sometimes choose to serve up to them. Instead, 
lawyers, policymakers, and scholars sometimes highlight one body of 
research while ignoring or glossing over the other.84 In the case of marriage 
equality, we worry that the lawyers’ strategic choice to magnify sameness 
may be dangerous. The appeal to sameness may implicitly suggest that if 
same-sex couples and parents were not able to achieve the same outcomes 
 
 78 See Robin J. Lewis et al., An Empirical Analysis of Stressors for Gay Men and Lesbians, 42 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 63, 77 tbl.7 (2002).  
 79 See, e.g., David M. Frost & Ilan H. Meyer, Internalized Homophobia and Relationship Quality 
Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals, 56 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 97, 105 (2009). 
 80 See Kimberly F. Balsam & Dawn M. Szymanski, Relationship Quality and Domestic Violence in 
Women's Same-Sex Relationships: The Role of Minority Stress, 29 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 258 (2005); Eli 
Coleman et al., Sexual and Intimacy Dysfunction Among Homosexual Men and Women, 10 PSYCHIATRIC 
MED. 257 (1992); Katie M. Edwards & Kateryna M. Sylaska, The Perpetration of Intimate Partner 
Violence Among LGBTQ College Youth: The Role of Minority Stress, 42 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1721 
(2013). 
 81 See generally Doyle & Molix, supra note 76 (surveying research and concluding that minority 
stress has a negative effect on same-sex relationship outcomes); Rostosky & Riggle, supra note 76 (same). 
 82 Our related article provides a fuller description of the bifurcation of LGBT identity and the 
government’s inordinate focus on “damage” in the context of HIV risk. See Robinson & Frost, supra note 
1. 
 83 See David M. Frost, Similarities and Differences in the Pursuit of Intimacy Among Sexual Minority 
and Heterosexual Individuals: A Personal Projects Analysis, 67 J. SOC. ISSUES 282 (2011) (showing that 
sexual minorities experience more barriers and devaluation to their relationship goals compared to 
heterosexuals); Frost & LeBlanc, supra note 74 (finding that the experience of struggling with social 
barriers to achieving one’s relationship goals partially explains why sexual minorities have poorer mental 
health than heterosexuals). 
 84 For an astute framework for courts and policymakers’ use of social science evidence in the family 
law context, see Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 296–
310 (2018). 
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as heterosexuals, it would be their fault and they would be unworthy of equal 
protection. Yet, as Clare Huntington has written, “Evidence on unequal 
outcomes for different demographic groups may be accurate, but the 
underlying conditions that create the family situations are often the result of 
systemic discrimination and inequality. Thus, using empirical evidence 
about poor outcomes to justify legal rules inflicts a second act of 
discrimination.”85 The marriage equality movement’s unmitigated embrace 
of sameness raises the risk of weakening Obergefell if scientific findings 
ultimately suggest adverse outcomes for same-sex couples and families.86 
This strategic decision to downplay discrimination for short-term gain may 
come back to haunt the LGBT community in the long term.87 
In the next Part, we first analyze the briefs in Obergefell to determine 
the extent to which they engaged these bodies of social science. We then turn 
to the Obergefell majority opinion to trace how the themes of sameness and 
minority stress surfaced even when the Court did not explicitly cite the briefs 
or the underlying studies. We follow that analysis in Part IV, which considers 
the road not taken, namely, a more inclusive and LGBT-affirming 
conceptualization of the marriage equality claim. 
III. SELECTIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE AT THE COURT: A CASE  
STUDY OF OBERGEFELL 
This Part provides a close examination of the use of social science in 
the Obergefell case to demonstrate how lawyers and judges may selectively 
draw on science to question or acquiesce to social hierarchy. First, we review 
the briefs filed in Obergefell to make manifest the broad sweep of the 
scientific evidence that was put before the Justices. Second, we show how 
the majority opinion drew on certain concepts from the scientific literature, 
while notably ignoring or downplaying others. Ultimately, we criticize the 
opinion for minimizing the minority stress experienced by many sexual 
minorities and denying that homophobia motivated states’ refusal to let 
same-sex couples marry. We also lament the opinion’s failure to transcend a 
 
 85 Id. at 293; see supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing studies that found that after 
statistically controlling for exposure to various forms of minority stress, differences in mental health 
between heterosexuals and sexual minorities were no longer detectable). 
 86 Recall that the psychological evidence that the Court invoked in Brown suffered grave 
methodological attacks. See supra note 36. 
 87 In the race context, the Court has recognized the wrongfulness of using societal discrimination as 
a justification for denying fundamental rights. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) 
(acknowledging that granting custody of a white child to a white mother who had married a black man 
would expose the child to discrimination but declaring: “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect”). In this regard, greater attention to race 
would have bolstered LGBT rights. 
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sameness framework and consider ways in which same-sex couples may 
differ from heterosexual couples in beneficial ways. 
A. Social Science in the Obergefell Amicus Briefs: A Systematic Review 
Assisted by a team of research assistants, we reviewed all of the briefs 
in Obergefell to understand the extent to which the various players in the 
case engaged sameness and minority stress literatures. Two research 
assistants with prior experience conducting qualitative research read and 
coded all of the party briefs and amicus briefs submitted in the Obergefell 
case. Before coding a brief, the research assistant would look to the list of 
“Other Authorities” in the brief’s table of contents. This list served as a 
starting point to give the research assistant a general idea of how heavily a 
brief relied on scientific research and where that research was likely to be 
found in the brief. The assistant would then read the brief and consider the 
context in which each scientific authority was cited. 
Only scientific studies, and authorities that made claims based on cited 
scientific studies, were coded and included in subsequent analysis. We 
leveraged the scientific reports to provide a comparative measure of the 
briefs’ relative attention to various bodies of social science research. We 
evaluated the text of the brief in order to determine whether the lawyers cited 
a study to advance a particular claim.88 These studies were initially coded 
based on four categories: (1) sameness, (2) damaging effects of minority 
stress, (3) positive difference, and (4) other science. “Sameness” studies are 
those that include references to how LGBT individuals, same-sex couples, 
or gays and lesbians are similar to heterosexual individuals—for example, 
studies that show that same-sex parents are just as successful at parenting as 
heterosexual individuals. “Damaging effects of minority stress” studies are 
those that include references to LGBT experiences of stigma, prejudice, and 
LGBT discrimination (i.e., minority stressors) and consider how minority 
stressors impact the physical or mental health of LGBT people. “Positive 
difference” studies are those that include references to how LGBT 
individuals are different, in a beneficial way, from heterosexual 
individuals—for example, studies that show studies show that same-sex 
parents are more likely than different-sex parents to instill in their children 
respect for gender and sexual orientation equality. The “other science” 
category was a catchall category for any cited scientific study that did not fit 
into any of the other enumerated categories. Any study that was difficult to 
 
88 One limitation of this science-focused methodology is that it did not allow us to measure the 
amount of text in a brief that was devoted to a particular body of research. However, there is no reason to 
believe that our primary emphasis on scientific citations, rather than text, favored one body of research 
over another. 
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properly sort into one of the mentioned categories was flagged by the 
research assistants as a “judgment call” and reviewed by the lead researchers. 
The data collected by both research assistants were aggregated and 
descriptive statistics were calculated. 
After an initial review of all of the briefs, we decided to focus on the 
briefs filed by the parties themselves and those filed by scientific 
organizations, as research suggests that these briefs are among those most 
likely to be read by Supreme Court Justices and clerks and to wield influence 
in the Court’s decisionmaking.89 Recognizing that not all research on 
minority stress is focused on its damaging effects on health, we expanded 
our definition of minority stress, which resulted in a fifth category, (5) 
experiences of minority stress. “Experiences of minority stress” studies are 
those with any reference to stigma, prejudice, and discrimination against 
LGBT people, with or without a reference to how that discrimination impacts 
the physical or mental health of LGBT people. The research assistants then 
recoded all of the briefs to account for this new code. We reviewed the 
coding periodically and provided feedback to refine the coding. 
Our review of the briefs indicates that the parties cited scientific studies 
sparingly, but when they cited social science, they favored sameness 
findings. Half of the parties’ scientific citations (23 of 46 citations) made 
sameness arguments. By comparison, just 17% of the parties’ scientific 
citations discussed minority stress.90 None of the parties’ scientific citations 
asserted positive differences of same-sex relationships. 
Perhaps the most influential brief of those filed by scientific authorities 
was from the American Psychological Association (APA), joined by the 
American Psychoanalytic Association, the National Association of Social 
Workers, the American Medical Association (AMA), and several other 
health-related organizations (for simplicity, we will refer to this as the “APA 
 
 89 See, e.g., Kathleen E. Hull, The Role of Social Science Expertise in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 
13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 471, 473 (2017) (discussing finding that briefs with social science “merited 
special consideration” among Supreme Court law clerks); Lynch, supra note 22 (studying Supreme Court 
clerks’ use of briefs and noting that parties’ briefs generally garner more attention than the typical amicus 
brief and found that a significant number of clerks consider briefs filed by medical and scientific 
authorities to be influential). Lynch’s study concluded that 54% of clerks stated that briefs citing social 
science receive special attention, and a significant number of clerks specifically mentioned the American 
Psychological Association (APA) and American Medical Association (AMA) as influential amicus filers. 
Id. at 50–51, 66. However, one quarter of clerks said that they give such briefs less attention, and the 
people in this group tended to have clerked for Justices Thomas and Scalia. See id. at 66–68. Lynch’s 
study also suggests “a credible public interest or research organization is much better positioned to 
provide social science findings than a typical litigant.” Id. at 67. 
 90 In our ultimate findings, we aggregate citations coded as “damaging effects of minority stress” and 
those coded as “experiences of minority stress” into a single category, which we call simply “minority 
stress.” 
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brief”).91 Of 115 citations to scientific authorities in the APA brief, 49.57% 
(57 citations) made sameness claims—roughly the same percentage of the 
parties’ citations that made sameness arguments.92 Just 4.35% (5 citations) 
concerned minority stress, and 2.61% (3 citations) raised positive 
differences. The American Sociological Association (ASA) filed another 
prominent brief.93 In the ASA brief, 46.67% (21 of 45) of the scientific 
citations concerned sameness, while 4.44% (2 citations) concerned minority 
stress, and none concerned positive differences.94 A brief by the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) may have served as a counterweight in 
that it featured more citations discussing minority stress (46.55%, 27 of 58 
citations) than sameness (10.34%, 6 citations).95 Figure 1 below summarizes 
our findings. 
It is of course always difficult to know whether and how briefs 
influence Supreme Court Justices. The parties and leading scientific 
organizations such as the APA, AMA, and ASA converged on sameness 
studies and minimized discussion of minority stress and positive differences. 
However, the APHA, which is another leading health organization, might 
have provided a crucial corrective to what we consider to be an overemphasis 
on sameness and downplaying of ongoing discrimination and its effects. In 
the next Section, we discuss the Obergefell majority opinion and find that, 
like the parties and the APA, it said far more about sameness than minority 
stress and completely ignored positive differences.96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 See Brief of the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 
2015 WL 1004713. Lynch’s study of Supreme Court clerks suggests that collaborative scientific briefs 
such as this may be particularly effective. See Lynch, supra note 22, at 58–59. 
 92 See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 93 See Brief of the American Sociological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1048442. 
94 See id. 
 95 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Public Health Association and Whitman-Walker Health in 
Support of Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 
1022680. A brief by the Cato Institute also favored minority stress, although it contained fewer overall 
uses of science than the briefs by the APA, ASA, and APHA. See Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute et 
al. in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 
2015 WL 1062557.  
 96 By contrast, the APA brief contained a few citations referencing positive differences. See Brief of 
the American Psychological Association et al., supra note 91. 
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FIGURE 1: SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE OBERGEFELL AMICUS BRIEFS 
 
B. The Obergefell Opinion 
 The core of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Obergefell asked whether 
the reasons why marriage is essential for heterosexuals also apply to same-
sex couples. This framing basically inquired whether same-sex couples are 
similarly situated to heterosexuals with respect to marriage.97 By evaluating 
four benefits of marriage, the majority concluded that “the reasons marriage 
is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex 
couples.”98 These four benefits are the following: (1) marriage as an 
expression of personal autonomy, (2) marriage as a unique opportunity, (3) 
marriage as a means of protecting children and family, and (4) marriage as a 
central social institution. As to the first benefit, Justice Kennedy wrote, “the 
right to personal choice regarding marriage” is an inherent aspect of 
autonomy “for all individuals.”99 As to the second benefit, the Court 
emphasized that marriage constitutes a two-person union of singular 
importance to individuals.100 
The Court’s first reference to harm arising from discrimination came 
with respect to its discussion of marriage’s third benefit: it “safeguards 
children and families.”101 Justice Kennedy stated that marriage provides 
social “recognition,” “material” benefits, and “legal structure” to the couple 
and their family.102 He observed that “all parties agree” that many same-sex 
couples provide loving families for their children.103 And, relying on 
 
 97 See 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (stating that the Court is “assessing whether the force and 
rationale of [marriage precedents such as Loving v. Virginia] apply to same-sex couples”). 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)). 
 100 See id. (“[D]ecisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can 
make.” (citations omitted)).  
 101 Id. at 2600. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
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demographer Gary Gates’s amicus brief, the Court noted that “hundreds of 
thousands of children are presently being raised by such couples.”104 This 
discussion of harms that befall children gave rise to the Court’s most overt 
reference to minority stress (although it did not use that term). It stated: 
“Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser . . . . 
The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of 
same-sex couples.”105 
As noted earlier, the Brown opinion similarly focused on the harms of 
policies that segregated black children.106 The Obergefell Court’s description 
of harm in this section of its analysis links marriage policy to internalized 
stigma (“suffer[ing] the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser”), which was also the focus of Brown’s analysis, but largely overlooks 
the law’s role in fostering stigma among peers, schoolteachers, extended 
family members, and the broader society.107 Both Brown and Obergefell raise 
concerns that the Court led with a description of harms imposed on innocent 
and vulnerable children to divert attention from adults’ stake in regimes that 
stigmatized racial and sexual minorities.108 In Obergefell, the focus on 
children may have seemed safer and more neutral than engaging the social 
status of sexual minorities (particularly gay men who are not raising 
children), whom some continue to view as sexually deviant and thus morally 
unfit for marriage,109 or heterosexual adults who oppose same-sex marriage 
because of such stereotypes. Brown’s emphasis on the fragile psyches of 
black children was similarly incomplete; it ignored the “psychological wage 
of whiteness” that many white adults perceived as a benefit of segregation.110 
Nor did the Brown Court discuss how segregation harmed white children by 
instilling myths about racial difference and white supremacy that have 
endured long into adulthood for many white Americans.111 
 
 104 Id. (citing Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1021451). 
 105 Id. at 2600–01 (citation omitted). 
 106 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 107 Cf. Guinier, supra note 36, at 102 (“Brown’s asymmetric focus on the psychological damage 
segregation did to blacks gave the psychological benefits segregation conferred on whites short shrift.”).  
 108 Brown, of course, specifically concerned the rights of schoolchildren, while Obergefell primarily 
concerned the rights of adults. 
 109 See Robinson & Frost, supra note 1 (critiquing this perspective). 
 110 Guinier, supra note 36, at 108. 
 111 See id. at 95–96, 102–03 (“The Court’s measure of segregation’s psychological costs counted its 
apparent effect on black children without grappling with the way segregation also shaped the personality 
development of whites.”).  
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With regard to the fourth benefit, Justice Kennedy wrote, marriage is a 
“keystone of our social order,” and excluding gays and lesbians from a 
“building block of our national community” is harmful to them.112 At this 
point, the Court described stigmatic harm more broadly, referring to all 
same-sex couples, not just those who are raising children. “[B]y virtue of 
their exclusion” from marriage, Justice Kennedy declared, “[s]ame-sex 
couples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would 
deem intolerable in their own lives . . . . It demeans gays and lesbians for the 
State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”113 
A more fundamental critique of the Court’s narrow discussion of stigma 
centers on the question of animus: whether states excluded same-sex couples 
from marriage because of group-based hostility. Brown largely elided the 
question of discriminatory intent or the reason why Whites forced black 
children into segregated schools. But Obergefell went a step further. Even as 
Justice Kennedy vindicated the rights of same-sex couples, he sought to 
disconnect exclusionary marriage laws from homophobia. Whereas his 
earlier Windsor opinion had accused opponents of same-sex marriage of 
harboring animus,114 he disavowed that claim in Obergefell. Indeed, Justice 
Kennedy went out of his way to proclaim that the view that marriage must 
be between one man and one woman “long has been held—and continues to 
be held—in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and 
throughout the world.”115 
This blanket blessing of opponents of same-sex marriage is in serious 
tension with the claim that exclusion from marriage demeaned and 
humiliated same-sex couples and their children. How precisely did millions 
of sincere and decent voters accidentally “impose stigma and injury of the 
kind prohibited by our basic charter”?116 Justice Kennedy never provides a 
satisfying answer to this puzzle. He could have looked to social science to 
find that, in fact, hostility toward gays and lesbians remains prevalent and 
 
 112 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 113 Id. at 2601–02. 
 114 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (identifying “strong evidence of [the 
Defense of Marriage Act] having the purpose and effect of disapproval of [same-sex married couples]”); 
id. at 2693–94 (concluding that the statute “demeans the couple,” “undermines” their relationship 
privately and publicly, and “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples”). 
 115 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2602 (“Many who deem same-
sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical 
premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”). 
 116 Id. at 2602–03. 
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undergirds opposition to same-sex marriage.117 But at this juncture, Justice 
Kennedy disregarded the empirical literature. His extremely generous and 
erroneous construction of opponents of same-sex marriage is reminiscent of 
President Donald Trump’s claim that good people were among those 
resisting the removal of Confederate statues in a violent confrontation in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017.118 And Justice Kennedy’s 
disavowal of homophobia may have consequences in the pending 
Masterpiece Cakeshop case, in which the Court is expected to decide 
whether commercial actors who invoke their religious faith are entitled to a 
constitutionally based exemption from state laws requiring businesses to 
provide services to LGBT people.119 Justice Kennedy’s willingness in 
Obergefell to conceive of apparently all opponents of same-sex marriage as 
good and honorable people should make LGBT advocates nervous. 
Ultimately, we conclude that minority stress surfaced in the Obergefell 
opinion only fleetingly and partially. And such references were undercut by 
Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that minority stress does not arise from 
homophobia. Moreover, the opinion’s acknowledgement of minority stress 
was overshadowed by the overarching conclusion of the four benefits of 
marriage that Justice Kennedy consulted to determine whether same-sex 
couples deserve access to the right to marry: the two groups are essentially 
the same and derive the same benefits from marriage. Although this focus on 
the benefits denied to same-sex couples may have been a strategic decision 
intended to ease public acceptance of the decision, the narrative emerging 
from the Obergefell decision disserves sexual minorities by downplaying 
ongoing health-related inequalities between gays and lesbians and 
heterosexuals arising from stigma, and by denying that hostility toward gays 
and lesbians and same-sex love and intimacy motivated the states’ denial of 
the right to marry. The APHA’s amicus brief provided a more expansive and 
ambitious framing of the relevant issue. Its opening line is: “Marriage 
equality is a civil rights issue—but it is a public health issue, too.”120 Because 
this concept did not make its way into the Obergefell opinion, readers of the 
 
 117 See generally Gregory M. Herek & Kevin A. McLemore, Sexual Prejudice, 64 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 309 (2013) (reviewing empirical research on prejudice against sexual minorities and discussing 
factors that contribute to a social context that promotes individual expressions of prejudice). 
 118 See Philip Bump, Trump Puts a Fine Point on It: He Sides with the Alt-Right in Charlottesville, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/08/15/trump-
puts-a-fine-point-on-it-he-sides-with-the-alt-right-in-charlottesville/ [https://perma.cc/HX6K-KQLF]. 
 119 Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Case on Religious Objections to Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-wedding-cake-gay-
couple-masterpiece-cakeshop.html [https://perma.cc/77GF-SBQB]. 
 120 Brief of the American Public Health Association & Whitman-Walker Health, supra note 95, at 2, 
*2. 
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opinion might never learn of the well-documented health consequences of 
discrimination against LGBT people. 
We close this Part by observing three additional ways in which Justice 
Kennedy discreetly narrowed the claim, which may have been motivated by 
a fear of disrupting the status quo. Not long after proclaiming that 
“reasonable” and “sincere” people of good faith oppose same-sex marriage, 
Justice Kennedy stated: 
Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the 
petitioners’ claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose 
nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage 
that underlies the petitioners’ contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. 
Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves 
because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities. And 
their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to 
this profound commitment.121 
First, the majority’s casual reference to gays and lesbians’ “immutable” 
nature intervenes in a longstanding debate within and beyond sexual 
minority communities concerning whether sexual orientation is fixed or 
fluid.122 Although individual sexual minorities have diverse and competing 
understandings of the degree to which they chose their orientation, Justice 
Kennedy appears to conceive of sexual orientation as a fixed trait, meaning 
that there is little possibility that changing marriage laws will promote 
homosexuality and shift cultural norms.123 This language might also be 
understood as an effort to allay the fears of “decent and honorable” 
opponents of same-sex marriage that gays and lesbians seek to “recruit” 
people into their ranks.124 In short, Justice Kennedy declared, gays and 
lesbians are “born that way,” and will remain a minuscule portion of the 
 
 121 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; see also id. at 2596 (“[S]exual orientation is both a normal 
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”). 
 122 See, e.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 1–2 (1990) (identifying 
competing conceptions of sexuality); Lisa M. Diamond, Female Bisexuality from Adolescence to 
Adulthood: Results from a 10-Year Longitudinal Study, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (2008) 
(demonstrating considerable fluidity in identification among a sample of nonheterosexual women); Janet 
E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994) (critiquing immutability argument and warning that it may divide 
LGBT community); Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and 
Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1356–61 (2011) (examining Los Angeles County men’s jail’s 
attempt to identify an essential gay identity and prevent heterosexual and bisexual men from qualifying 
for the jail’s “gay” unit). 
 123 Cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (stating that expanding marriage to include same-sex couples 
“pose[s] no risk of harm to themselves or third parties”). 
124 If that was the intent of this language, we think Justice Kennedy should have named this fear as 
a harmful stereotype. 
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population.125 This view is in tension with research evidence demonstrating 
that sexuality can be fluid and subject to change over one’s lifetime.126 
Second, throughout the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy also makes 
clear that his opinion applies only to “two people” who wish to marry, not to 
people who want to have a union of three or more partners recognized by the 
law.127 He thus shuts down the claims of dissenters that the majority ruling 
will lead to plural marriage. Third, in the above quote, the Court emphasizes 
same-sex couples’ “need” to assimilate into traditional marriage rather than 
“demean” or transform it.128 This is another move that underscores the 
essential sameness of gays and lesbians, frames marriage equality as an 
assimilation project, and erases positive differences. These three rhetorical 
moves carefully confined the claim that the Court recognized and reaffirmed 
the status quo. 
IV. IMAGINING A MORE INCLUSIVE MARRIAGE EQUALITY MOVEMENT 
The decidedly narrow scope of the claim that Obergefell embraced, as 
well as the tension between sameness studies and minority stress findings, 
betrays a broader debate within the LGBT community. Marriage has been—
and remains—a divisive issue among LGBT people. Many people perceive 
the legal validation of same-sex marriage as recognizing LGBT people’s 
core humanity and equality with heterosexuals. Others, however, view 
marriage, or at least the marriage equality movement, as an attempt to 
assimilate into mainstream society, which they consider a betrayal of “queer” 
values. From this vantage point, LGBT people should be focused on 
disrupting dominant norms, not blending into them.  
Academics and activists have long debated this question,129 but a Pew 
survey of LGBT people illustrates the salience of this divide among ordinary 
Americans:  
 
 125 See Robinson, Unequal Protection, supra note 11, at 227–28 (identifying some structural 
advantages that gays and lesbians have over people of color in terms of their claims disturbing the status 
quo, including that only 1.7% of the public identifies as gay or lesbian). 
 126 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 122. 
 127 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; id. at 2608 (“In forming a marital union, two people 
become something greater than once they were.”); id. at 2607 (“[T]hese cases involve only the rights of 
two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.”); id. 
at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective ‘two’ in various 
places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be 
preserved while the man-woman element may not.”). 
 128 See id. at 2594 (majority opinion). 
 129 See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE 113 (1999); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK: 
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401–05 
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About half of survey respondents (49%) say the best way to achieve equality is 
to become a part of mainstream culture and institutions such as marriage, but 
an equal share say LGBT adults should be able to achieve equality while still 
maintaining their own distinct culture and way of life.130 
Thus, the strategy of the LGBT movement and its allies in Obergefell—
which emphasized sameness to the detriment of acknowledging 
differences—is in tension with the values of half of the relevant 
community.131 
The discomfort that a significant number of LGBT people have about 
marriage’s prominence overlaps with racial and socioeconomic disparities. 
Studies suggest that middle-class and affluent people, whether heterosexual 
or LGBT, are more likely to take advantage of the right to marry or seek a 
civil union or domestic partnership.132 Low-income people of color, 
especially African-Americans, are potentially less likely to benefit from the 
efforts of the marriage equality movement as much as affluent white people 
in part because people of color are underrepresented in the population of 
LGBT people in same-sex partnerships.133 This practical disparity in access 
 
(William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993); Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of 
Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2004). 
 130 PEW RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, EXPERIENCES AND VALUES 
IN CHANGING TIMES 12–13 (2013), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/06/
SDT_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU92-8UKC]. 
 131 LGBT people differ significantly in terms of which “differences” they see as linked to LGBT 
identity and worthy of recognition or preservation. For example, several scholars have critiqued 
monogamy and argued that public sex is integral to queer identity. See, e.g., WARNER, supra note 129, at 
113–14. But see Robinson & Frost, supra note 1, at 6–7 (challenging attempts to “fuse” gay identity with 
promiscuity and HIV). By contrast, the differences that we call attention to primarily concern the impact 
of minority stress on LGBT lives and differences related to egalitarian relationship practices and raising 
children who are more likely to subscribe to gender and sexual orientation equality. 
 132 See, e.g., GARY J. GATES, DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIED AND UNMARRIED SAME-SEX COUPLES: 
ANALYSES OF THE 2013 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2015), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Demographics-Same-Sex-Couples-ACS2013-
March-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG6S-YRFN] (“[P]overty is substantially less common among 
married same-sex couples (4%) than among unmarried same-sex couples (18%).”); Hui Liu et al., Same-
Sex Cohabitors and Health: The Role of Race-Ethnicity, Gender, and Socioeconomic Status, 54 J. 
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 25, 32–33 (2013) (demonstrating that same-sex cohabiting couples report higher 
socioeconomic status than different-sex cohabiting couples or single men and women). 
 133 See GATES, supra note 132, at 2 (stating that just 23% of people in married same-sex couples are 
people of color, compared to 26% of those in married different-sex couples); Christopher Carpenter & 
Gary J. Gates, Gay and Lesbian Partnership: Evidence from California, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 573, 579 
(2008) (analyzing two California surveys with large samples of gays and lesbians and concluding that 
“partnered gay men are older, more likely to be white, and more highly educated compared with 
nonpartnered gay men”); id. (finding that partnered lesbians are more likely to be white than the overall 
category of lesbians); id. at 583–85 (finding that those in legally registered domestic partnerships are 
more likely to be white and have the highest incomes of all gay men and that black men and women are 
particularly underrepresented in officially registered domestic partnerships). Blacks are underrepresented 
both among those in same-sex and different-sex marriages: while 13.3% of Census respondents identified 
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to marriage has provoked some harsh critiques of the marriage movement. 
For example, Kenyon Farrow, a black queer man, wrote “Is Gay Marriage 
Anti Black???”134 Angela Harris, who is a black woman, has offered a 
formidable critique of what she calls the LGBT movement’s “neoliberal” 
foundation.135 In a piece written before Obergefell, she worried that the 
Supreme Court’s eventual embrace of same-sex marriage would simply 
create a path “from Stonewall to the suburbs” for affluent gays and lesbians, 
leaving many sexual minorities behind.136 
Marriage equality is a deeply important step toward eliminating 
discriminatory social policies and structural stigma in LGBT lives, but we 
regret that the framing of the issue in some legal arguments and public 
discourse has exacerbated division. If the people who organized, funded, and 
litigated for marriage equality had been more aware of and committed to 
protecting the interests of marginalized members of the community—of 
“[l]ooking to the bottom”137—how would they have articulated the claim for 
marriage equality? This reimagined marriage equality claim would have 
offered more than symbolic benefits to LGBT people who face social 
obstacles in their pursuit of marriage or are not interested in marriage. At a 
minimum, it would have created a foothold for courts and other government 
bodies to recognize the full scope of the injuries that sexual minorities 
experience because of homophobia and heterosexism—not simply the 
formal denial of a marriage license. Instead, the questionable turns and 
strategic choices of the marriage equality movement narrowed the scope of 
the underlying claim and the class of people who stood to benefit from a 
victory. 
For example, the marriage equality movement made the strategic 
decision to focus only on gays and lesbians, rather than all sexual minorities. 
With virtual uniformity, the movement’s briefs recited “gays and lesbians” 
 
as “Black or African-American alone,” QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/T8Y6-ZCB2], 6% of those in same-sex married 
couples and 7% of those in different-sex married couples identify as Black or African-American, see 
GATES, supra note 132, at 4. 
 134 See Kenyon Farrow, Is Gay Marriage Anti Black???, CHICKENBONES (Sept. 29, 2007), 
http://www.nathanielturner.com/isgaymarriageantiblack.htm [https://perma.cc/3G3L-JM9Z]; see also 
Marlon M. Bailey et al., Colloquy, Is Gay Marriage Racist?: A Conversation with Marlon M. Bailey, 
Priya Kandaswamy, and Mattie Udora Richardson, in THAT’S REVOLTING!: QUEER STRATEGIES FOR 
RESISTING ASSIMILATION 113, 113–14, 117–19 (Mattilda, a.k.a. Matt Bernstein Sycamore ed., 2008). 
 135 Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539 (2006). 
 136 Id. at 1582. 
 137 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (arguing that “those who have experienced discrimination speak with a 
special voice to which we should listen”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1594 
as the relevant class, even though bisexual, transgender, and other sexual or 
gender minorities stood to benefit from marriage equality.138 To be sure, 
studies suggest that gays and lesbians are far more likely to seek to marry a 
person of the same sex than a bisexual person.139 The vast majority of 
bisexuals in cohabiting relationships are partnered with someone of a 
different sex.140 However, this pattern is at least partly explained by the fact 
that a relationship with a different-sex partner offers a path to marriage and 
higher social status, whereas same-sex relationships are stigmatized and 
(before the Court’s decisions in Windsor and Obergefell) were generally 
ineligible for marriage.141 Thus, the current partnering patterns of bisexuals 
should not be understood as fixed, but rather receptive to social and legal 
changes that make same-sex partnering a more viable option.142 
Transgender people also have a more complicated relationship to 
marriage. Some transgender people could marry pre-Windsor and Obergefell 
because they could change their legal sex under state law, because they chose 
to marry someone of a different sex, or because the state considered their 
relationship to be different-sex, even though the transgender people 
considered themselves to be in same-sex relationships.143 With respect to the 
latter group, however, the only reason why the state allowed the marriage 
was the state’s refusal to respect the person’s gender identity. In lifting state 
marriage limitations based on gender, Obergefell freed some transgender 
people to marry without disrespecting their gender identity. Therefore, 
although restrictive marriage laws impacted bisexual and transgender people 
differently, these groups still had a stake in the movement.  
The “gay and lesbian” framing of the legal briefs also seems strikingly 
out of tune with the proliferation of identities among the youngest sexual 
minorities. Millennial women increasingly seem likely to prefer the label 
 
 138 See Robinson & Frost, supra note 1, at 13; Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality & 
Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010, 1060 (2014) [hereinafter Robinson, Postracialism]. 
 139 See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek et al., Demographic, Psychological, and Social Characteristics of 
Self-Identified Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a US Probability Sample, 7 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. 
POL’Y 176, 194 (2010). 
 140 See id.  
 141 To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that all bisexuals who partner with a person of a different 
sex are pursuing status or assimilation. The point is to be mindful of how, in general, power and status 
can influence relationship choices, rather than to identify any particular person as acquiescing to 
compulsory heterosexuality. 
 142 See Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (arguing that “same-sex marriage bans channel individuals, 
particularly bisexuals, into heterosexual relations and relationships, impermissibly burdening sexual 
liberty interests”). 
 143 Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It with You: Constitutional Consequences 
of Interstate Gender Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 833–36 (2005); Robinson, Postracialism, 
supra note 138, at 1061 n.267. 
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“queer” to “lesbian,” in part because it suggests a more fluid set of attractions 
to people of different genders. Young people are also claiming terms like 
“pansexual” or refusing sexual labels altogether.144 Now, we are not naïve 
enough to suggest that Justice Kennedy is prepared to utter (or understand) 
the word “pansexual.” Our point is that the narrow construction of the class 
as “gay or lesbians” may eventually make Obergefell’s conception of sexual 
minorities look anachronistic and may reduce its relevance to younger 
generations. 
We see similar limitations in the scholarly literature cited in the APA 
brief. Marriage equality litigators chose to represent the relevant class as 
having a fixed, stable identity, which likely explains why they did not 
directly engage with identities such as “bisexual,” which may be understood 
as affording the individual more choice. Moreover, the lawyers selected 
plaintiffs who were likely to appeal to the Justices in that they were 
disproportionately white and middle- or upper- class.145 While the lawyers 
who fought for marriage equality generally made strategic choices that 
limited the relevant class and how it was represented, social science scholars 
were more likely to confront practical constraints preventing them from 
developing a more inclusive sample, often resulting in samples that were 
disproportionately white, affluent, and female.146 The scholars also faced 
 
 144 See, e.g., Kristi E. Gamarel et al., Identity Safety and Relational Health in Youth Spaces: A Needs 
Assessment with LGBTQ Youth of Color, 11 J. LGBT YOUTH 289, 297 (2014); Lauren McInroy & Shelley 
L. Craig, Articulating Identities: Language and Practice with Multiethnic Sexual Minority Youth, 
25 COUNSELLING PSYCHOL. Q. 137, 145 (2012) (describing different labels used in the LGBTQ 
community). According to one definition, pansexual identity “is used merely to express the openness and 
fluidity to people of all genders.” What Is Pansexual?, STOP-HOMOPHOBIA.COM, http://www.stop-
homophobia.com/pansexuality.htm [https://perma.cc/5VCL-LG6Q]. 
145 Robinson & Frost, supra note 1, at 12–13. For example, Edith Windsor’s lawyer argued that a case 
involving a person who filed for bankruptcy would make for an unsympathetic plaintiff. Ariel Levy, The 
Perfect Wife, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-
perfect-wife [https://perma.cc/7D2V-NFXH]. Of the plaintiffs in Obergefell, 83% were white, compared 
to 67% of the LGBT community. While 24% of the LGBT community makes less than $24,000 in 
income, none of the Obergefell plaintiffs fell into this category. Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 136, 139 (2015).  
 146 See, e.g., Stephen Erich et al., A Comparative Analysis of Adoptive Family Functioning with Gay, 
Lesbian, and Heterosexual Parents and Their Children, 1 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 43, 51 (2005) (stating 
that over 91% of gay/lesbian respondents and 88% of heterosexual respondents were Caucasian); Rachel 
H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families: Does Parental Sexual Orientation 
Matter?, 14 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 164, 167 (2010) (reporting that 80% of parents were white 
and just 3% were “Latino, Asian, or Multiethnic/Biracial”); id. at 168, 175 (describing demographic 
characteristics of sample as “high educational attainment” and “high income levels” and that lesbian and 
gay parents “were situated within relatively supportive legal landscapes”); Charlotte J. Patterson, Family 
Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1052, 1064 (2000) (“[M]uch of the 
research has involved small samples that are predominantly White, well-educated, middle class, and 
American; the degree to which results would hold with other populations is thus difficult to evaluate.”); 
id. at 1061(summarizing literature and concluding that “[l]ittle information is yet available on differences 
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methodological challenges in identifying hard-to-find populations, such as 
bisexuals and transgender people.147 Nonetheless, it is valuable to 
contemplate how the lawyers’ rhetoric and the scientific studies similarly 
gravitated toward the most elite members of the LGBT community instead 
of “looking to the bottom.” 
The marriage equality movement’s use of social science evidence may 
have also strategically omitted several significant differences between same-
sex and different-sex relationships.148 This sameness strategy seemingly 
entailed glossing over things that make same-sex couples unique. The APA 
brief provides an illustrative example, although the discussion could be 
extended to characterize the marriage equality movement’s use of social 
science more broadly. The following discussion focuses only on studies cited 
in the APA brief and brings to the fore themes that were overlooked by that 
brief. Our review shows that social science scholarship can be useful not just 
in supporting strategic legal arguments of no difference but also in its 
potential to highlight positive differences that might serve as exemplars for 
all families. We organize this list of apparent differences beginning with 
those that we think would have been the least controversial within the 
marriage equality movement to those that could have generated significant 
controversy and legal risk.149 
First, several studies suggest that female couples and, to a lesser extent, 
male couples, divide household labor and childrearing in a more egalitarian 
fashion than heterosexual couples. Specifically, a second mother is more 
 
attributable to race or ethnicity, family economic circumstances, cultural environments, or related 
variables”).The centrality of affluent white lesbians in this body of scholarship is especially concerning 
because recent studies suggest that, within the LGBT community, women of color are the most likely to 
be parents, and men of color are more likely to parent than white men, and that families raising children 
are likely to face socioeconomic disadvantage. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 132, at 6–7. 
 147 See, e.g., Herek et al., supra note 139, at 178, 182. 
 148 Our discussion builds on prior critiques by two sociologists and a subsequent article by a law 
professor. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents 
Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159 (2001); Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, 
Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257 (2009). 
 149 We note briefly two differences that we have discussed elsewhere, which suggest a divergence 
between gay men and lesbians, and which posed significant risks of threatening the marriage equality 
claim. Some studies, based primarily on nonprobability samples, suggest that gay men in relationships 
are less likely than lesbians to endorse and practice monogamy. See Russell K. Robinson, Diverging 
Identities, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 212 (Carlos A. Ball ed., 2016) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Diverging Identities] (discussing studies). A related issue is HIV prevalence, 
which is much higher among gay men than lesbians. See Robinson & Frost, supra note 1, at 8 n.22, 18. 
While discussing HIV’s impact on gay male relationships might have generated sympathy, it also might 
have triggered fears of gay male promiscuity. See id. at 22 (describing pervasive stereotypes that “gay 
and bisexual men are incapable of maintaining enduring, healthy relationships because they are less 
sexually responsible, more sex-focused, and indiscriminate in selecting sex partners, as compared to 
straight people; because of their sexuality, [they] are inherent vectors of disease”). 
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likely than a father to be engaged in childrearing.150 Second, same-sex parents 
may be less likely to use physical punishment.151 As virtually all of these 
studies emphasize, children of same-sex parents are as likely as children of 
heterosexual parents to achieve positive outcomes. It is noteworthy, 
however, that same-sex partners appear to do this while using less physical 
punishment.  
Third, some studies have found that children of female same-sex 
parents actually surpassed children of different-sex parents on certain 
measures of healthy development. For example, some studies found that 
adolescents raised by two mothers “scored significantly higher on . . . self-
esteem than the adolescents in mother-father families” and “scored 
significantly lower on the conduct problems scale.”152 A review by E.C. 
Perrin declares: “growing up with parents who are lesbian or gay may confer 
some advantages to children. They have been described as more tolerant of 
diversity and more nurturing toward younger children than children whose 
parents are heterosexual.”153 
Fourth, some scholarship suggests that children of same-sex parents are 
more likely to endorse gender equality.154 A related question is whether 
parents should pressure their children to adhere to rigid gender roles.155 We 
suspect that there is consensus among liberals that the former outcome 
(greater endorsement of gender equality) is positive, but liberals might differ 
on the value of the latter outcome (more gender flexibility). For instance, one 
study found that “daughters of lesbian mothers were more likely to be 
 
 150 See, e.g., Henny Bos et al., Lesbian & Heterosexual Two-Parent Families: Adolescent-Parent 
Relationship Quality and Adolescent Well-Being, 24 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 1031, 1032 (2014) (“Studies 
have shown that co-mothers in intact planned lesbian families were more involved in childrearing than 
fathers in intact mother-father families.”); Patterson, supra note 146, at 1054; Charlotte J. Patterson, 
Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children: A Social Science Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES 141, 147, 152 (D.A. Hope ed., 2009) 
(reporting that lesbian mothers exhibited more equitable division of labor and were more satisfied with 
division, which may be better for kids); Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Socialization in the Context of Family 
Diversity, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION 202, 217 (J.E. Grusec & P.D. Hastings eds., 2d ed. 2015) 
(“[L]esbian couples report sharing household tasks and parenting duties more equally than do 
heterosexual couples.”).  
 151 Patterson et al., supra note 150, at 214 (“Lesbian mothers were . . . less likely to report 
‘smacking.’”); id. at 217 (“Lesbian mothers and gay fathers are less likely than heterosexual parents to 
report the use of physical punishment.”). 
 152 Bos et al., supra note 150, at 1039. 
 153 E.C. Perrin et al., Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 
109 PEDIATRICS 341, 343 (2002). 
 154 See, e.g., Henny Bos & Theo G.M. Sandfort, Children’s Gender Identity in Lesbian and 
Heterosexual Two-Parent Families, 62 SEX ROLES 114, 119 (2010) (finding that children in lesbian 
families “were less likely to regard their own gender as superior”). 
 155 See id. (stating that children in lesbian families “reported less parental pressure to conform to 
gender stereotypes than children in heterosexual two-parent families”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1598 
described as taking part in rough and tumble play or as playing with 
‘masculine’ toys such as trucks and guns.”156 People who promote traditional 
gender roles might see in these findings evidence of gay and lesbian parents 
problematically promoting gender nonconformity.157 
Finally and perhaps most controversially, some studies indicate that 
children of same-sex parents are more open than children of different-sex 
parents to romantic or sexual relationships with a person of the same sex.158 
A study by Henny Bos and Theo Sandfort found that children with two 
mothers “[were] more likely to question future heterosexual romantic 
involvement.”159 While legal arguments for marriage equality may have 
benefitted from avoiding this finding, an alternative take on these findings 
reveals something inspiring. Most LGBT people were raised in settings in 
which heterosexual parents, peers, and institutions such as schools and 
churches communicated in explicit or implicit ways that they should be 
heterosexual and cisgender.160 As a result, much of the internal work that 
sexual and gender minorities must do as they approach emerging adulthood 
 
 156 Patterson, supra note 146, at 1059. 
 157 The ASA brief seems to respond to these fears by claiming that “among same-sex parents, one 
partner commonly fills the ‘male-instrumental role while the other fills the female-expressive role’ in 
rearing their children.” Brief of the American Sociological Association, supra note 93, at 19 (quoting 
DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND 
MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 147 (1996)). This passage 
is sadly reminiscent of the essentialist question that heterosexuals sometimes ask of same-sex couples: 
“Who’s the man, and who’s the woman?” While sexual minorities should be free to understand their 
relationship in gender-complementary terms, the ASA’s thinly supported claim that this is a “common” 
configuration appears to cater to a heteronormative assumption that same-sex couples can only be 
understood as a variation on a heterosexual relationship. 
 158 See Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents: Psychology, Law, and Policy, 
64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 727, 733 (2009) (“[T]he young adult offspring of lesbian mothers report feeling 
fewer antigay sentiments than do the offspring of heterosexual mothers. . . .” (citing FIONA L. TASKER & 
SUSAN GOLOMBOK, GROWING UP IN A LESBIAN FAMILY: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT (1997))). 
Curiously, Patterson characterized this and other findings of difference as “not relevant to policy debates.” 
Id. As we indicate in the text, we think such positive differences are deeply relevant. 
 159 Bos & Sandfort, supra note 154, at 120; see also Patterson, supra note 146, at 1056 (discussing 
a study by Marjorie Hill that found that African-American lesbian mothers were “more relaxed about sex 
play”); Patterson et al., supra note 150, at 216 (noting study that found that young adults with lesbian 
mothers were more likely than those raised by heterosexual parents to acknowledge attraction to the same 
sex and act on it, but not more likely to identify as lesbian or gay (citing TASKER & GOLOMBOK, supra 
note 158)). 
 160 See Kathleen P. Farrell, HIV on TV: Conversations with Young Gay Men, 9 SEXUALITIES 193, 194 
(2006) (noting how young gay men learned about HIV stigma from media sources); David E. Newton, 
Representations of Homosexuality in Health Science Textbooks, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 247, 248-49, 251 
(1979) (reviewing textbooks and finding that very few mentioned homosexuality, and those that did 
depicted homosexuality in a negative light); Emily Sweetnam Pingel et al., Creating Comprehensive, 
Youth Centered, Culturally Appropriate Sex Education: What Do Young Gay, Bisexual, and Questioning 
Men Want?, 10 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 293, 297-98 (2013) (reporting that gay-identified 
children were more likely to seek guidance online as opposed to asking their parents or people at school). 
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entails figuring out how to reconcile their feelings, attractions, and evolving 
sense of personal identity with parental and social expectations. 
This dilemma is the source of much minority stress, and parental 
expectations in particular may keep some people from ever coming out of 
the closet.161 From this vantage point, children of gays and lesbians enjoy 
greater freedom to question their sexual identities without fear of parental 
rejection—a benefit that we should seek to extend to all children. In addition, 
the findings on gay and lesbian parents’ greater acceptance of gender 
flexibility might suggest that they would be more supportive if a child 
eventually identified as transgender.162 
Most of these findings were downplayed not only by the APA but by 
many of the scholars who produced these studies. The Bos and Sandfort 
study, discussed previously, is exceptional in its candor: “In sum, our 
findings regarding feeling parental pressure to conform to gender 
stereotypes, feeling that their gender is superior, and doubting future 
heterosexual romantic involvement, our findings do not support the ‘no 
difference’ consensus in empirical research on lesbian-parent 
families . . . .”163 The marriage equality movement’s omission of the 
differences that we have summarized provided an incomplete and misleading 
description of the relevant research. A more frank and transparent 
exploration of similarities and differences might have helped bridge fissures 
in the LGBT community regarding whether marriage equality is about 
assimilation and denial of differences. 
The strategic reasons for avoiding some of these findings are obvious, 
particularly the findings concerning gender flexibility and openness to a 
same-sex relationship. But others seem much less risky, such as findings that 
lesbian mothers are more engaged and egalitarian parents. These studies 
offered a chance to vindicate the interests of same-sex parents and their 
children and call into question certain aspects of heteronormativity. 
Therefore, we do not think that strategic concerns fully justified the marriage 
equality movement’s unyielding adherence to the “no significant 
 
 161 Deborah Tharinger & Greg Wells, An Attachment Perspective on the Developmental Challenges 
of Gay and Lesbian Adolescents: The Need for Continuity of Caregiving from Family and Schools, 
29 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 158, 158 (2000); Gill Valentine et al., Coming Out and Outcomes: Negotiating 
Lesbian and Gay Identities with, and in, the Family, 21 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 479, 483–84 
(2003). 
 162 Our discussion is somewhat speculative because the APA did not cite any studies concerning 
parents of children who identify as transgender. Moreover, we recognize that among lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual (LGB) people, there are different, and sometimes competing, conceptions of gender. And there 
is considerable transphobia among some LGB people. This question of whether LGB parents are more 
supportive of transgender children strikes us as an important future scholarly inquiry. 
 163 Bos & Sandfort, supra note 154, at 124 (citations omitted).  
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differences” mantra. Moreover, our review is a reminder of how oppressive 
forces infuse and structure legal arguments that are intended to overturn 
those very same forces.164 A movement to upend homophobic marriage laws 
was itself confined by homophobia, which influenced which arguments 
could be articulated. 
The Court’s opinion in Obergefell focused narrowly on marriage and 
offered too little to sexual minorities who are not partnered or raising 
children. The Court’s marriage opinions have refrained from declaring 
sexual orientation a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, a holding that would 
have had major implications for every claim based on sexual orientation, 
reaching beyond Obergefell’s focus on marriage and parenting. Moreover, 
the marriage opinions could be read to suggest that achieving marriage is the 
pinnacle of LGBT rights.  
The marriage equality movement bears some responsibility for this 
framing because its use of social science largely framed denial of access to 
marriage as a unique harm rather than sufficiently connecting it to 
overlapping structural forms of subordination, which cannot be eradicated 
simply by granting marriage licenses. The movement’s narrow focus seems 
most beneficial for the most affluent members of the class, those who 
managed to obtain stable, satisfying, and exemplary relationships and, in 
some cases, to raise healthy children, despite significant exposure to minority 
stress. The plaintiffs and others who are similarly situated accomplished 
these positive outcomes without significant government assistance. We 
regret the failure of the marriage equality movement also to attend to those 
who have been less fortunate and are in need of greater governmental aid. 
This framing reinforced critiques of LGBT rights as “neoliberal” in 
character.165 
Many sexual minorities are not prepared to take advantage of marriage 
equality because they are struggling with basic needs, such as access to stable 
housing, or because they are incarcerated. LGBT people are 
disproportionately likely to be homeless and to be incarcerated.166 Even in 
 
 164 Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz have made a similar point concerning the framing and 
reporting of social science studies that are relevant to policy debates. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 
148, at 160 (“[T]he pervasiveness of social prejudice and institutionalized discrimination against lesbians 
and gay men [] exerts a powerful policing effect on the basic terms of psychological research and public 
discourse on the significance of parental sexual orientation.”). 
 165 See Harris, supra note 135, at 1581–82. 
 166 LAURA E. DURSO & GARY J. GATES, SERVING OUR YOUTH: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF SERVICES PROVIDERS WORKING WITH LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER 
YOUTH WHO ARE HOMELESS OR AT RISK OF BECOMING HOMELESS 3 (2012), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Durso-Gates-LGBT-Homeless-Youth-
Survey-July-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE2Z-4X9W] (“LGBT youth represent between 30% and 43% 
of those served by drop-in centers, street outreach programs, and housing programs . . . .”); Bianca D.M. 
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the marriage equality era, LGBT sexuality remains highly stigmatized. As a 
result, many sexual minorities continue to hide their identities and to conduct 
any sexual or romantic relationships in secret. Many sexual minorities’ 
attempts to form enduring romantic relationships are hindered by 
discrimination at work, at school, in public, and from parents and other 
family members.167 
As important as the couple-focused social science work is, it does not 
represent sexual minorities who are not in such relationships but may desire 
them. The minority-stress-related barriers and challenges that sexual 
minorities face in the process of identifying potential partners, dating, and 
negotiating intimacy are equally deserving of scientific examination. People 
currently in long-term committed relationships appear to be about one-half 
of the community of people who identify as LGBT.168 Moreover, identity 
appears to influence access to relationships. For example, studies suggest 
that women are more likely to be in committed relationships. According to a 
2013 Pew study, 60% of gay men are single and 40% are in a committed 
relationship. By contrast, 34% of lesbians are single and 66% are in a 
relationship.169 Several other studies have also found that gay men are less 
likely than lesbians to be partnered.170 In the more inclusive marriage equality 
claim that we imagine, the lawyers would have used the social science to 
shed light on challenges that apply throughout the LGBT community, 
including at various stages of relationship formation and dissolution. 
 
Wilson et al., Disproportionality and Disparities Among Sexual Minority Youth in Custody, 79 J. YOUTH 
ADOLESCENCE 1547, 1553 (2017) (finding that nearly 40% of girls in custody identify as lesbian, gay or 
bisexual); Lara Stemple & Ilan H. Meyer, The Unspoken Horror of Incarcerated LGBT People, 
ADVOCATE (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:06AM), https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2017/2/23/unspoken-
horror-incarcerated-lgbt-people [https://perma.cc/J7JW-JTPQ] (“The incarceration rate of lesbian, gay, 
and bisexual people is three times greater than that of American adults generally.”).  
 167 See generally, e.g., David M. Frost et al., Couple-Level Minority Stress: An Examination of Same-
Sex Couples’ Unique Experiences, 58 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 455, 456 (2017) (discussing unique 
types of discrimination faced by people in same-sex relationships). 
 168 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 130, at 70 (finding that 54% of LGB people are in relationships 
of any duration). This number, however, includes many bisexuals who are in relationships with someone 
of a different sex (40% of the total LGB people in relationships); just 9% of bisexuals in relationships 
have a same-sex partner. Id. at 5, 82.  
 169 Id. at 70. 
 170 See, e.g., Carpenter & Gates, supra note 133, at 587 (“We find partnership estimates of about 
37% to 46% for gay men and 51% to 62% for lesbians.”); id. (summarizing related studies); Herek et al., 
supra note 139, at 194 (noting that “60% of gay men and 57% of bisexual men were not in a committed 
relationship, compared with fewer than one fourth of lesbians and bisexual women.”); see also Robinson, 
Diverging Identities, supra note 149, at 214–15 (discussing additional studies). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Essay highlights how various institutional pressures influence and, 
in some cases, confine civil rights claims and the presentation of social 
science research that bears on such claims. We have shown the importance 
of holistic, multidimensional representations of stigmatized groups rather 
than, for example, framing sexual minorities as only the same as or only 
different than heterosexuals. Marriage equality advocates treated all 
differences as problematic, yet we recognize that some differences arise from 
discrimination—which ought not be minimized—and other differences may 
be positive. The centrality of the most privileged gays and lesbians in the 
marriage equality movement obscured how minority stress, race, class, 
gender identity, and other factors overlap to limit access to relationships and 
marriage, even after Obergefell. Thus, marriage equality lawyers’ attempt to 
“play it safe” may have exposed LGBT people to future vulnerabilities by 
downplaying the effects of homophobia. 
Although the first third of this Essay focused on race and the remainder 
concerns sexual orientation, we have sought to show how race and sexuality 
are intertwined and should not be understood as distinct struggles.171 For 
example, there is evidence that being a sexual or gender minority (such as a 
black transgender woman) compounds the discrimination generally faced by 
black and brown people in the criminal justice system.172 Thus, our story 
about judicial indifference to racial disparities in criminal law should not be 
understood as a story disconnected from sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Similarly, our sketch of a more inclusive marriage equality 
movement makes evident how the most marginalized sexual and gender 
minorities, including people of color, were relegated to the sidelines in 
Obergefell. This dynamic unnecessarily perpetuated perceptions that 
marriage equality is a white, assimilationist project. We have also sought to 
draw doctrinal connections between cases that otherwise might be regarded 
as strange bedfellows, including McCleskey, Obergefell, and Grutter. The 
connecting thread in these cases is the judicial struggle to enforce equal 
protection while minimally disrupting the status quo and extricating the 
 
 171 See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139 (describing the tendency to view discrimination based on race and gender through a “single-
axis framework” and advocating for a broader framework of antidiscrimination research); David M. Frost, 
The Benefits and Challenges of Health Disparities and Social Stress Frameworks for Research on Sexual 
and Gender Minority Health, 73 J. SOC. ISSUES 462, 467–68 (2017) (highlighting the importance of 
engaging with intersectionality and minority stress in research on health inequalities faced by sexual and 
gender minority populations). 
 172 See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 166, at 1553 (finding that sexual minority girls of color are 
vastly overrepresented in juvenile custody). 
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courts from extended structural reform. Although many lawyers have catered 
to this judicial instinct, we want to highlight those who have pressed the 
Court to think bigger, including the brief by experimental psychologists in 
Fisher, who sought to show a connection between standardized tests and 
stereotype threat, and the APHA brief in Obergefell, which characterized 
marriage equality as a public health issue.173 We encourage scholars and 
lawyers similarly to resist the “fear of too much justice.” 
  
 
 173 Although neither of these briefs was successful in infiltrating the Court’s opinion, it is important 
to note that they did not prevent the Court from ruling for affirmative action in Fisher and marriage 
equality in Obergefell. This is a powerful challenge to those who argue that anything other than the 
narrowest and most risk-averse argument will harm the cause. 
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